Author's answers to questions on Buddhist philosophy, posed to him by some foreign scholars.

In a pair of very important papers, namely “Space, Time and Individuals” in the Journal of Philosophy for October 1955 and “The Indestructibility and Immutability of Substances” in Philosophical Studies for April 1956, Professor N. L. Wilson began something which badly needed beginning, namely the construction of a logically rigorous “substance-language” in which we talk about enduring and changing individuals as we do in common speech, as opposed to the “space-time” language favoured by very many mathematical logicians, perhaps most notably (...) by Quine. This enterprise of Wilson's is one with which I could hardly sympathize more heartily than I do; and one wishes for this logically rigorous “substance-language” not only when one is reading Quine but also when one is reading many other people. How fantastic it is, for instance, that Kotarbinski1 should call his metaphysics “Reism” when the very last kind of entity it has room for is things —instead of them it just has the world-lines or life-histories of things; “fourdimensional worms”, as Wilson says. Wilson, moreover, has at least one point of superiority to another rebel against space-time talk, P. F. Strawson; namely he does seriously attempt to meet formalism with formalism—to show that logical rigour is not a monopoly of the other side. At another point, however, Strawson seems to me to see further than Wilson; he is aware that substance-talk cannot be carried on without tenses, whereas Wilson tries to do without them. Wilson, in short, has indeed brought us out of Egypt; but as yet has us still wandering about the Sinai Peninsula; the Promised Land is a little further on than he has taken us. (shrink)

В работе обсуждаются естественнонаучные и антинатуралистические концепции, редукционистики и холистический подходы и т.п. Для всех, кто интересуется проблемой сознания.

In this work author analyses names with the period of existence greater than zero. The whole body of names is divided into 1) “long-timed words” and 2) “singular words”. It is shown that in Peirce Triangle the name itself, its denotation and meaning may last in different combinations. Typology of “long-timed words” and “singular words” is described. New notion describing the world of possible and real objects is introduced - Ontological Space or Writing Sample. Tetrahedron of Propis is also introduced (...) with meaning rather than name as its apex. It is shown than neither “name” nor “denotate” can exist without sense whilst sense can exist without “name” or “denotate”. The fact that Writing Sample consists of “segments-streaks” is justified. It is also shown that “long-timed words” do correspond to these “segments-streaks” of the Propis. Analysis of the Propis led to formulating fourteen axioms that its “segments-streaks” and “long-timed words” obey. (shrink)

يضم هذا الكتاب، الصادر عن المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات، البحوث والمناقشات التي قُدّمت في ندوة تعارض المصالح في الدولة والمجتمع التي عقدتها المنظمة العربية لمكافحة الفساد في بيروت، يومي 15-16/09/2015. وشارك فيها عدد من المسؤولين والناشطين المهتمين بالشأن العام، إضافة إلى بعض الفاعليات البحثية والأكاديمية ممن يمثل الاتجاهات السياسية والاقتصادية والفكرية والثقافية المهتمة بقضايا التنمية والحوكمة ومكافحة الفساد في الأقطار العربية.